The electronic badge handed to attendees at DEF CON 34 is also the public debut of an unusual chip. Its removable core contains Baochip-1x, a RISC-V system-on-chip built to make more of the system inspectable than a conventional security device.
That does not make the badge unbreakable. The project instead asks whether researchers can use published software, hardware-design records and infrared inspection of the manufactured die to investigate discrepancies between the design and the finished device.
Independent reporting from Wired says the DEF CON 34 badge ships with a removable Baochip core that attendees can keep using after the conference as a hardware security token. The badge is the first large deployment of the chip rather than proof that its security design has survived sustained attack.
The design opens more layers to inspection
Baochip-1x uses a 32-bit RISC-V processor running at up to 350 MHz, paired with 2 MiB of SRAM and 4 MiB of nonvolatile RRAM. Its hardware documentation identifies the manufacturing process as TSMC's 22-nanometre ultra-low-leakage technology and describes cryptographic, random-number and sensor blocks around the main processor.
The software is built around Xous, a Rust-based operating system developed by the same community. The project's published materials include operating-system and firmware source, the processor core, cryptographic engines, input/output logic and developer tooling. Wired therefore describes the system as “mostly” open source rather than completely open at every layer.
The physical package is part of the experiment. Unlike a standard opaque chip package, the Baochip core is designed so researchers can inspect the die with infrared imaging and compare visible structures with the published design. That comparison could help expose a manufacturing change or an unexpected hardware block.
Inspection is not the same as verification. A visual comparison can increase confidence and make some tampering easier to investigate, but it cannot prove the absence of every defect, hidden behaviour or side channel. Baochip co-founder Andrew “bunnie” Huang told Wired that a laboratory with enough money and specialised equipment could probably defeat the device, and he expects researchers to find previously unknown flaws.
Tapeout records turn source code into evidence
The public Baochip-1x hardware repository contains the register-transfer-level logic used to describe the chip, its documentation, simulation support and FPGA development stubs. It uses the CERN Open Hardware Licence Version 2—Weakly Reciprocal.
The repository also preserves tagged or branched versions associated with individual tapeouts—the point at which a design is sent for manufacture. That matters because the fabricated chip's fixed logic cannot be patched like software. A fixed tapeout record gives researchers a specific design artifact to compare with the manufactured die instead of a moving development branch.
The hardware record still has limits. Public source helps reviewers understand intended logic, reproduce simulations and look for discrepancies, but it does not automatically validate the fabrication process or every analogue property of a physical device. The Baochip hardware book also labels itself a work in progress, so researchers should expect gaps or changing documentation around the fixed tapeout artifacts.
The badge is the beginning of the test
During DEF CON, the chip powers the badge's interactive features. Afterward, the removable core is intended to work as a hardware authentication token. The project also provides MicroPython and C or Rust development paths, giving attendees several ways to explore the hardware rather than leaving the chip as a sealed conference souvenir.
Baochip's official project site says CrossBar hosts the tapeout and TSMC fabricates the wafers, while Baochip buys packaged and tested chips. It says mass production began in the second quarter of 2026 and lists general availability for the fourth quarter. Those dates are the vendor's current plan, not a guarantee of supply.
For now, the badge gives the security community something more valuable than a claim of invulnerability: a widely distributed target with unusually rich evidence. Researchers can inspect code, compare hardware descriptions with a specific tapeout and examine the physical die. The credibility of the approach will depend on what they discover—and on how the project responds when they find weaknesses.
